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abstract: According to Roy Sorensen, when one looks at the Moon, during a solar 
eclipse, what she sees is its inner (concave) part of the farther, reflective one, and not 
the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite . To make his point clearer, he put 
forward the famous example of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets Far 
and Near . From the observer’s vantage point, the two planets have the same apparent 
diameter and overlap . What the agent sees is a dark disk, but believes that what she is 
seeing is Near, because Far is behind it . Sorensen claims that what she actually sees is 
planet Far and that the causal theory of perception explains why this is the case . Of 
course, this position stands against common sense . Sorensen shows that it counters 
Alvin Goldman’s renowned observation criteria too . Nonetheless, he maintains, since 
Near is causally idle and the agent does see something, the only possible conclusion 
is that she sees Far, pace Goldman – and common sense . In this paper, I try to dem-
onstrate that Sorensen is wrong and that the correct solution to the eclipse riddle 
is that the observer sees Near . As a matter of fact, besides meeting common sense 
and Goldman’s observability criteria (along with others), Near can be legitimately be 
considered the object of a successful perceptual discrimination even in the light of 
the causal theory of perception .
key words: Causal theory of perception, eclipse, Goldman, observation, Seeing Dark 
Things, silhouettes, Sorensen .
“Common sense wisdom is the soil of reason and always 
provides a healthy antidote against the vagaries of specula-
tive philosophy .”
Ghins (2005: 95)
“By all means, correct common sense when it’s mistaken .”
Sorensen (2008: 202)
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Roy Sorensen’s Seeing Dark Things (2008) has been deservedly hailed as 
a very interesting, captivating and instructive book, while at the same time 
quite easy to read and understand . Yet, it raises difficult questions, to which 
Sorensen gives, in some cases, controversial answers . One of them is the fa-
mous “eclipse riddle”, originally discussed in his prize-winning article “Seeing 
Intersecting Eclipses” (1999) . The first two chapters of Seeing Dark Things are 
devoted to this topic .
Figure 1 – Double-eclipse scenario
As is well known, according to Sorensen, a magician witnessing a double 
eclipse such as the one sketched above would see planet Far – its absorptive 
surface, actually, which would be the inner (concave) part of the farther, re-
flective one – and not planet Near, for the first is blocking light, while the 
second is causally idle .
Sorensen thinks this is “a bold consequence of the causal theory of per-
ception given natural background assumptions” (2008: 42); but, admittedly, 
it is also counterintuitive and paradoxical (see 2008: 49) . The aim of this 
paper is to show that the idea that we see Far rather than Near is in fact para-
doxical and that, in a double-eclipse scenario, what we actually see is Near .
The role of the causal theory and the only two alternatives
As Sorensen explains, Far does not satisfy any of the three conditions Alvin 
Goldman proposed to determine whether an object is seen and does seem to 
violate any counterfactuals-based criteria of observation (see 2008: 22–24) . 
Yet, he considers that we should favor the causal theory1 and conclude that, 
1 But isn’t this a top-down approach, contrary to Sorensen’s initial “declaration of intent” 
(see Sorensen 2008: 19)?
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since it is Far that blocks light (and not Near), it is Far that we also see (and 
not Near) .
According to the causal theory of perception, there must exist an ap-
propriate causal connection between agent S and object O in order for the 
former to see the latter . Then again, blocking light is but a necessary condi-
tion for seeing an object when backlit, because it is not only by virtue of the 
light it blocks that we see a cat silhouetted against the moon (see 2008: 22), 
but also of the differences it makes with its surroundings (see 2008: 55) . A cat 
blocking only a thin laser beam in a moonless night cannot be seen .
On the other hand, says Sorensen, this necessary condition precludes the 
possibility that we see Near during a double eclipse, because the planet is totally 
within the shadow cast by Far and, above all, causally idle (see 2008: 22) .
The other two possible alternatives are not taken in much consideration 
by Sorensen . If, in a double-eclipse situation, we cannot see Near, for it does 
not block light, but admitting that we see Far seems too great a burden to 
bear, then perhaps one could conclude that we actually see nothing . Sorensen 
dismisses this possibility in a few words: “When a theory of perception pre-
dicts that you cannot see something that you do see, then you ought not to 
believe the theory” (2008: 6) . I agree with him on this, something is seen dur-
ing a double eclipse . The alternative that we see nothing is rightly ruled out .
But then perhaps what we see is neither Far nor Near, but the scattered 
object Far + Near (see Aranyosi 2008) . I agree again with Sorensen, though . 
Saying that we see this mereological sum makes no difference and is of no 
advantage at all (see Sorensen 2008: 59–60) . For the question would arise 
anyway: which part of the scattered object would we be seeing? Near or Far?
We are left with only two alternatives then .2 Sorensen says the magician 
sees Far (he is a magician, after all) . I hope I’ll be able to show that, despite 
his magical talent, the conjuror actually sees Near, as we all do .
The cognitive ingredient of observation
Since obtaining information is a necessary condition for observation, So-
rensen conveniently shows that his account of vision in backlit situations 
contemplates also the acquisition of information . In a section called “Why 
we see the backs of silhouetted objects” (see 2008: 60–64) he uses the example 
of a solar eclipse to show that the acquisition of information during such an 
event is consistent with his theory .
2 I do not think anyone would claim that we should consider the alternative that what 
we see are sense-data, nowadays; let alone the alternative that what we see is another entity, 
distinct from the two planets . Either we see Near or we see Far . Or so I argue .
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He succeeds, but the gain in knowledge he mentions (there are no huge 
tunnels running straight through the Moon; we can see peaks of mountains 
along the profile of the only natural satellite of planet Earth) is also compat-
ible with the common sense idea that what we see during the eclipse is the 
side of Moon which is always facing Earth . It is thus evidence in favor of So-
rensen’s account only in the sense that it is not against it, but not in the sense 
that it privileges his thesis over others .
Reverse optical relationship
One argument Sorensen puts forward in order to defend his claim that in the 
double-eclipse scenario he depicts what we see is Far and not Near is that, in 
backlit conditions, the closer a silhouette is the darker it appears . He main-
tains that, since the silhouette an observer sees in his Gedankenexperiment is 
less dark than how Near’s one would appear, were Far not present, then it 
must be Far’s .
I am afraid this is not evidence in favor of the claim that what the ob-
server sees is Far’s silhouette, though . Sorensen writes: “Were it not for Far, 
Near would have a silhouette darker than the one we are now viewing, for the 
extra brightness of the background would make Near’s silhouette darker by 
comparison” (2008: 26) . True, but since Far is present, the brightness of the 
background is reduced and Near’s silhouette does appear less dark as well – as 
it seems to be implicitly admitted in Sorensen’s passage .
This means that the amount of darkness of the observed silhouette were 
probably the same, be Near present or not .3 If such is the case, then the 
silhouette’s “lack of darkness” cannot be evidence in favor of the thesis that 
what we see is Far . This fact is perfectly compatible with the opposite thesis, 
that what the observer sees in a double-eclipse scenario is Near .
Silhouettes
Persuaded that endorsing the causal theory of perception would bring one 
to conclude that during a solar eclipse what we see is the absorption layer of 
the Moon and not the surface facing Earth, Sorensen is forced to assume that 
in backlit conditions the silhouette of an object coincides with its absorptive 
surface . Common sense tells us that the silhouette of a body is the “attached 
shadow”, instead (see Sorensen 2008: 28) .4
3 Were it different, that would be evidence in favor of the thesis that what we see is Near!
4 That would be its two-dimensional “beginning”, the leading edge of a three-dimen-
sional volume (the shadow), while the “cast shadow” would be its two-dimensional “end” .
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A look at five among the best-known dictionaries available on-line5 does 
not help settle the question, for all of them say either that the silhouette is but 
a dark shape or that it is the outline of a body (or both), but none of them 
takes party on the issue of which surface that would be – provided that there 
is a party to take, for Sorensen’s seems to be an isolated position, not to men-
tion that both Collins and Macmillan dictionaries associate the silhouette 
with the shadow of a solid figure .
Then again, even if they stated that the silhouette is that part of the 
shadow’s surface which is attached to its caster, they might just be wrong 
– under the assumption that we call silhouette what we see in backlit condi-
tions, of course .
Since it is commonly understood that the silhouette of a body is what we 
see when we look at the entity in backlit conditions, what Sorensen should 
show, in order to maintain a bottom-up approach, is that the former corre-
sponds to the absorption layer of the observed entity (in the case of the Moon 
during a solar eclipse, the inner (concave) part of the surface that faces the 
Sun, for example) . Then, of course, this would amount to saying that what 
we see in backlit conditions is the absorption layer of the observed body .
In his book, Sorensen claims that the silhouette is a part of the object 
even before trying to convince the reader that it is legit to do so (see 2008: 
26 and 31) . However, he then presents a section called “A rationale for the 
silhouette rule”, in which we learn that a good rationale “for counting the 
sighting of a silhouette as a sighting of the object is that the visual match is 
good enough” (2008: 36) . Sometimes cast shadows too exhibit a good visual 
match, but not always . What happens in general is that an object’s “genuine 
silhouette has a more robust resemblance to the object than does the object’s 
cast shadow” (2008: 38) . Why is that so? The answer comes in the next sec-
tion, which is about shadows as pseudoprocesses . Seeing the silhouette of 
an object amounts to seeing the object, says Sorensen, while seeing its cast 
shadow is merely seeing an effect of it (see 2008: 39) .
Of course that explains the most robust resemblance that a silhouette has 
if compared with a cast shadow, but not why the silhouette actually is part of 
the observed body . Inferring that the silhouette cannot be part of the shadow 
because of the difference with the cast shadow would clearly be a fallacy . The 
argument is still compatible with the thesis that the silhouette corresponds 
to the part of the shadow which is attached to its caster – its leading edge .6 
5 Merriam-Webster, Cambridge, Oxford, Macmillan and Collins .
6 In this case, observing the silhouette would still count as observing its caster, such as 
when I notice the new shirt a friend of mine is wearing at the same time that I see him . Or the 
logo of a tire company on the side of a blimp . The same goes for the cast shadow on a wall . 
One can see both the shadow and the wall at the same time .
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Therefore one cannot rule out this possibility and conclude that, since there 
are no other alternatives, the silhouette must be part of the observed entity 
(inferring that it corresponds to the absorption layer would require an addi-
tional step, for it is not obvious that this would be the chosen part; as a matter 
of fact, the resemblance argument is also compatible with the idea that the 
silhouette is the surface of the object that is facing the observer) .
Sorensen puts forward another example, however . Imagine a blimp mov-
ing in the sky: as we all know, the shadow that the aircraft casts on the ground 
follows the caster’s movements . “But the stages of the shadow’s movements 
are not related as cause and effect . Rather, they relate to the stages of the 
blimp’s movements” . Sorensen concludes that this is an instance of what El-
liot Sober and Wesley Salmon call a pseudoprocess, “governed by the blimp’s 
movement” (2008: 40) .
The stages of the silhouette’s movements, on the other hand, he contin-
ues, are related as cause and effect . For any change of the silhouette is inher-
ited by its future stages, while this is not true of the cast shadow . Therefore, 
when we look at the silhouette of the blimp, we see a causal process .
The conclusion Sorensen infers out of this example is that, since “an in-
trinsic change in the silhouette constitutes an intrinsic change in the object, 
the silhouette is part of the object” (2008: 41) . My claim is that, instead, 
this is true only if we have already assumed that the silhouette is part of the 
object .
The other way around, the sentence is obviously true: if the silhouette 
is part of the object, then an intrinsic change in the silhouette constitutes 
an intrinsic change in the object . But the way Sorensen puts it is not . For 
if, following common sense, one assumes that the silhouette of the blimp is 
its attached shadow, then there could be intrinsic changes in it that do not 
result in a change in the object . Suppose one points a stage light to the blimp 
and follows its movements so that the logo of a tire company, painted on the 
side of the blimp, is always on sight . That would be an intrinsic change on 
the silhouette (interpreted as being the leading edge of the shadow) with no 
influence at all on its caster .
In sum, for Sorensen’s claim – that any permanent change in the silhou-
ette results in (corresponds to, actually) a permanent change in the object – to 
be true, we must assume that the silhouette is part of the object . But then the 
circularity is patent .
Back to square one, then . In the two sections devoted to discussing sil-
houettes, what Sorensen actually shows are mere effects of his postulation – or 
rather, of what he thinks is a consequence of endorsing the causal theory of 
perception – that a silhouette is part of the object observed in backlit condi-
tions . They are not evidence in favor of this thesis – let alone in favor of the 
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thesis that the silhouette corresponds to the absorption layer of the observed 
entity . The only argument he has (but it’s a powerful one!) is the appeal to 
the causal theory .
My claim is that the silhouette of an object is not what Sorensen thinks it 
is . But I will also try to show that his thesis is not a consequence of the causal 
theory either, or else we would be forced to reject it, via modus tollens, and 
that would be a too strong and undesired result .
Let’s now turn, then, to why I disagree with Sorensen on what happens 
when we look at something or someone in backlit conditions .
The phenomenological side
Sorensen’s account of what happens in a double-eclipse scenario – and in 
backlit objects vision in general – does not seem to correctly capture the 
phenomenological aspect of observation . Borrowing Marc Alspector-Kelly’s 
words, we might say that the sense that one really is looking at Near when 
she sees a Sorensenian double eclipse, or at the nearest face of a backlit object, 
is phenomenologically irresistible (see Alspector-Kelly 2004: 336) . It is com-
mon sense too, of course .
This kind of awareness comes, among other things, from the conscious-
ness (usually implicit) that observation is an action, involving the body as a 
whole, even when we only focus on vision .7 If one wants to see the inner part 
of an eggshell, she cracks open the egg, removes its content and looks inside . 
She does not point it against the moon at night . We know “by default” that 
it would be useless – and weird too… But I will not press this subject further 
and focus instead on a paradox that I think is a consequence of assuming 
Sorensen’s view on backlit vision . Before that, a couple of words about the 
object of perception is in order .
The object of perception
John D . Greenwood defines the intentional object of observation as being “the 
object or state of affairs which is the real object of our successful perceptual 
discrimination” . The intentional object of observation, explains Greenwood, 
“exists quite independently of any theories I have about it, and my theory 
about it and observation of it plays no role in its constitution” (Greenwood 
7 “Ocularism” is the term Hasok Chang coined for the privileging of the sense of vision 
over all others (see Chang 2004: 879) . Sorensen himself admits, in the introduction, that his 
book “is philosophy for the eye” (2008: 9) .
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1990: 558) . This clearly applies to any entity observed in backlit conditions 
as well .
Along the same lines, in a well-known paper on the topic, Roberto Tor-
retti wrote that observation is an “attentive, deliberate, explicitly cognitive 
mode of perception” (1986: 1) . I am not sure about the “deliberate” part, be-
cause which is the object of perception is not always the result of a conscious 
decision on the agent’s part . Still, we might consider it as being what “catches 
the attention” of the agent, that is external to her and causes a mental state to 
the subject that she did not have before the perception . In other words, the 
object of observation is the entity on what the agent’s attention focused, or 
by which it was triggered .
Suppose Roger Federer is visiting the extraordinary archeological site of 
Paestum, at sunset, during the Paestum Balloon Festival . The Swiss athlete is point-
ing a tennis ball to the Sun while at the same time a perfectly spherical balloon passes 
in front of the star that the ancient Greeks called Helios . From Federer’s vantage 
point, the tennis ball and the balloon have the same apparent diameter and 
overlap . All he sees is a dark disk, but he believes that what he is seeing is the 
tennis ball he is holding .
According to Sorensen, however, the Swiss is wrong . unbeknownst to 
him, what Federer is actually seeing is the (internal) side of the balloon that 
faces the Sun . But is that so? Let’s take a look from the above:
Figure 2 – View from above
The situation is totally analogous to the double-eclipse scenario 
sketched at the beginning of this paper and we already know the reason 
why, according to Sorensen, what the observer sees is the inner (concave) 
part of the surface of the balloon that is facing the Sun . But let’s now 
consider another “view from above”, this time depicting the actual visual 
rays – as Euclid would have done, drawing straight lines from the eyes 
of the observer to the surface of the object that he is seeing (or judges 
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he is seeing, according to Sorensen) .8 I will take into account both eyes, 
however .
Figure 3 – View from above (vision of the tennis ball)
If the observer wants to see the tennis ball, his eyes focus on it (see the 
trajectory of the visual rays in the sketch above), be the ball frontlit or backlit . 
If he wants to see the balloon, instead, he first takes the tennis ball out of the 
line of sight and then his eyes focus on the balloon (see the trajectory of the 
visual rays in the sketch below), be it frontlit or backlit .
Figure 4 – View from above (vision of the balloon)
What have been sketched are two different actions, leading to two different 
results . In the situation depicted in figure 3 above, a tennis ball is the real object of 
a successful perceptual discrimination; in the situation depicted in figure 4, it is a 
balloon . Two different actions, two different objects of perception . Or so I argue .9
8 Sorensen thinks Euclid’s optics is not fit for dealing with backlit observations: “…sil-
houettes force a correction of Euclid’s optics . A complete geometry of the visual field must 
include backlit objects” (2008: 8–9) . Yet, he only tells us why we should do it, but not how . 
And this is a general remark I have on Sorensen’s position: he tells us why we see the absorptive 
surface of an object when backlit – rather than the side that is facing us – but does not explain 
how this happens . Old Euclid’s optics does .
9 A little research on ophthalmology on the internet confirms that it is actually so . “Just 
behind the pupil (the black hole in the center of your eye) and iris (the colored part of your eye), 
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Once again, the lesson we can draw from all this is that in talks about 
perception we should take into account that observation is an action, involv-
ing the whole body, even when we focus on vision alone .
Sorensen did not take this into account and this lead him to peculiar 
conclusions, to which he would have probably not gotten had he followed 
this piece of advice . His results are not just peculiar, though . They are para-
doxical too, as I will now try to show .
An astronomical paradox
Figure 5 – Eclipse scenario on Solar System*
In a solar system similar to ours, Earth*’s natural satellite has the form of a 
truncated cone and occupies a position in space such that, during a partial 
eclipse of Sun*, for an observer on point O on Earth*’s surface, Moon*’s 
nearest surface – B – is close enough to exactly compensate for its smaller size 
with respect to shadow formation . B and A – Moon*’s farthest surface – look 
the same size from the observer’s vantage point . (Note how disc A and disc B 
have the same apparent diameter in the picture above) .
The height of the truncated cone – i .e ., the distance between A and B 
– is 10 light-seconds . The distance between Moon* and Earth* – i .e ., be-
tween B and O – is 10 light-seconds too .
According to Sorensen, contrary to common sense, what the subject in 
O observes (sees) in this situation is not surface B but A’, that is, the inner 
part of the illuminated surface (which, in this case, is A) .
lies the crystalline lens, which is connected at its outer rim to the ciliary body by ligaments called 
zonules . The lens focuses light rays on the retina, the thin, light-sensitive inner layer at the rear of 
the eye . Muscles in the ciliary body enable the flexible lens to alter its shape and allow the eye to 
focus on objects at varying distances . When you look at a tree far away, for instance, the muscles 
relax and stretch the zonule ligaments, which in turn pull on the lens, causing it to flatten and as-
sume a thin contour . But shift your gaze to something close, such as a computer screen, and the 
muscles contract and loosen the zonules, which makes the lens thicker and curved more in the 
middle . The ability of the lens to focus from far to near is called accommodation” (Fine 2016) .
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However, on surface B (which, as happens with “our” Moon, always faces 
Earth*) a huge space station has been built, occupying the most part of the 
truncated cone’s minor base – being always in the dark and protected from 
Sun*, the temperature on B is fit for living and all the devices work without 
major problems . When the base is in operation, it can be seen from Earth*, 
because of the huge quantity of light used – it resembles a big city at night, 
seen from a space shuttle or from an airplane . In this other case, Sorensen 
admits that what the subject in O observes is B, because observing a relevant 
part of an object amounts to observing the object .
Suppose now that the base on surface B is in full activity, while a sudden 
power outage occurs . During the first 10 seconds, the observer in O keeps 
seeing the illuminated base – therefore surface B . Right after that, she starts 
seeing a dark disk . What would that be? I do not think Sorensen could claim 
that the observer started seeing A’ immediately after seeing B . Right, in Seeing 
Dark Things he says that “the image of the silhouette does not need to travel 
through the wall to reach the observer . The darkness lying between the long 
side of the wall and the observer is there by default” (2008: 28) . I agree that 
the image of a silhouette does not travel through solids . Let’s also assume, for 
the sake of the argument, that it is “already there”, by default, as Sorensen 
claims . Then perhaps he could try and use a similar argument to defend that, 
at the very same moment in which she “sees” the power outage, the observer 
in point O starts seeing A’ (and does not see B anymore) . But would this be 
a legitimate answer?
If, instead of a power outage, what happened were a sudden disappear-
ance of Moon*, during the first 10 seconds the observer in O would still see 
the illuminated base, therefore surface B, exactly as in the case of the power 
outage . 10 seconds later she would see a dark disk (again), but in this case 
that would be a sort of “light gap” . After another 10 seconds, a “light disk” 
would reach her eyes and fill the “hole” in the image of Sun* . Why would 
this be the case for light, but not for the image of A’? It is worth noting that, 
as said before, in order to defend the idea that the observer actually sees A’ 
during an eclipse, Sorensen maintains that information gathering (about A’) 
does take place (see 2008: 61–62) and that, as he remembers us, according 
to the relativity theory, no signal can travel faster than light (see 2008: 41) . 
Now, the image of A’ carries information, therefore is a signal and cannot 
travel faster than light .10 This means that the only way it can reach the eyes 
10 It could if it were a shadow, according to Sorensen (see 2008: 41) . But his point is 
exactly that a silhouette is not a shadow (or part of a shadow) . I must add that I disagree with 
Sorensen over the alleged possibility that a shadow can travel faster than light . The slogan 
“No host, no parasite” (see 2008: 142) he uses about what he calls “para-reflections” is true of 
shadows as well . All holes are metaphysical parasites (see 2008: 187) . Since shadows are holes 
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of the observer at the very same moment in which she ceases to see B is that 
the image is “already there” . But what would this mean? Wouldn’t it be just 
an ad hoc answer, with no real meaning?
Note also that in case we admit, in the power outage example, that the 
observer keeps seeing surface B, even after the power failure, no apparent 
paradox would arise and the account of this event would sound far less arti-
ficial… Let’s see, then, why I think the correct answer to the eclipse riddle is 
that the observer sees Near and not Far .
Why we see Near rather than Far
Admitting that in Sorensen’s double-eclipse situation we see Near (its facing-
the-observer surface) rather than Far has some positive collateral effects, that 
have already been mentioned before: it saves both common sense and the 
(probably related) phenomenologically irresistible feeling that what we are 
seeing is actually Near; it is compatible with the information that, according 
to Sorensen, we gather through observation; it solves the astronomical para-
dox presented in the previous section .
Still, one might legitimately think that, once we have rejected Sorensen’s 
idea that what we see is Far, we should only admit that what we see is Near 
provided it satisfies some observation criteria . I claim it does, as will now try 
to show .
First of all, let’s examine the three factors to determine whether an object 
is seen that Goldman famously identified (see Goldman 1977) . Does Near 
satisfy the environmental condition? Sorensen thinks it does, but also that it 
violates the other two (see Sorensen 2008: 24) . He thus concludes that, ac-
cording to Goldman’s requirements, Near is not seen .
Strictly speaking, though, Near does not satisfy the environmental condi-
tion, for it is not illuminated (see Goldman 1977: 262) . We might ignore this 
constraint, however, or loosen the environmental requirement, as Sorensen 
seems to do, and merely focus on the fact that Near lies within a conical 
region radiating outward from the perceiver’s open eyes . With this qualifica-
tion, Near does satisfy the environmental condition – while Far does not .
Let’s now turn to the counterfactual dependency condition . Sorensen 
judges that Near does not satisfy it because, were the planet not present, the 
scene would appear the same to the perceiver . But perceptual content, as Alva 
Noë explains, is two-dimensional: “It can vary along a factual dimension, 
in regard to how things are . And it can vary along a perspectival dimension, 
in the light, how can my thumb’s shadow move faster than the speed of light if it only exists 
provided that there is light surrounding (and traveling with or “carrying”) it?
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in regard to how things look from the vantage point of the perceiver . Visual 
experience always has both these dimensions of content” (Noë 2003: 95) . For 
this reason, “the right sort of counterfactual supporting dependence must be 
maintained along both dimensions of content” (2003: 96) .
I agree with Noë on this and argue that his remark applies to the case 
of Near too (as to any other case), for suppose the observer travels East on a 
space shuttle, then of course the scene before her eyes would be different and 
would certainly appear different to her – in other words, her visual experi-
ence would consequently be different . Which means that Near does satisfy the 
counterfactual dependency condition .
Observation has to do with (the possibility of ) triangulating and keep-
ing track both of how things are per se and of how they are in relation to the 
perceiver (see Noë (2003: 96); but also Ghins (2005: 96), Azzouni (2004: 
129–136), Bueno (2011: 278) and Buekens (1999: 26), among others) . And 
with the fact that “our perception of the world is essentially that of an embod-
ied agent, engaged with, or at grips with the world” (Taylor 1979: 154) .11 So-
rensen seems to have disregarded all this and concluded that neither Near nor 
Far satisfy the counterfactual dependency condition . I claim that, contrary to 
his conclusion, Near does – for the reasons that have just been shown .
Perhaps two factors out of three are enough to defend that what one sees 
during the double eclipse depicted in Seeing Dark Things is Near,12 but we still 
might score 100% . The third condition is the so-called “physical mechanism 
factor”, which “involves the transmission of light from objects to the per-
ceiver’s eyes” (Goldman 1977: 266) . Now, it is certainly true that, during the 
eclipse, Near does not transmit light to the perceiver’s eyes; but the scene in 
front of her does and Near is part of it . “Seen objects normally make a holistic 
contribution to the scene”, admits Sorensen, adding that they “are visible by 
virtue of the differences that they make with their surroundings” (2008: 55) . 
He also considers, however, that they should cause the contrast (see 2008: 65) 
and that this explains why we don’t see Near, despite it being part of the scene 
being observed, for it is Far that blocks light (and not Near) .
To this, some might answer kantianally: it is the scene before her eyes as 
a whole that causes the subject’s perception, not a single object . Near is part 
of the scene and this might be enough to claim that it causally contributes to 
the perception .
Along the same lines, one might think that, since we are able to see 
something only via perceptual discrimination, then we do not see Near (or 
11 “In perception, the world acts on us, and we act right back” (Noë 2003: 100) .
12 That’s what happens with black holes, for example, according to Sorensen (see 
2008: 23) .
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Far) alone, especially if they are not illuminated .13 This also means that what 
allows the subject to see Near is not the light blocked, as claimed by Sorensen, 
but the light reaching her eyes, which “carries” the planet’s image .14
The point is that even in case we are not ready to admit that anything 
which is in the visual field of the perceiver is responsible for what she sees, 
we must at least admit that it cannot be a planet alone either . With this in 
mind, it can be claimed that since Near is part of the scene that reaches the 
eyes of the perceiver, it satisfies the physical mechanism factor and can be le-
gitimately considered the object of perception in the double-eclipse scenario 
imagined by Sorensen .
In addition, we can also affirm that, contrary to what Sorensen main-
tains, since the human eyes are photoreceptors, then we do need light to see .15 
This allows us to reverse some of the claims Sorensen makes in his book . 
“Consider the black letters on this page . You see them in virtue of the light 
they absorb, not the light they reflect” (2008: 4) . I argue that we see them by 
virtue of the light that their immediate environment reflects, instead . “The 
bird watcher sees the stork by virtue of the light it blocks” (2008: 7) . Same 
thing . “A cat silhouetted against the moon can be seen by virtue of the light 
it blocks” (2008: 22) . I claim it can be seen by virtue of the light the moon 
reflects, in lieu . And yes, of the contrast between this and the silhouette too 
– whatever that is . And so on .
As an alternative to the idea that Near causes the perception because 
of its holistic contribution to the scene before the subject’s eyes, we might 
follow István Aranyosi and appeal to David Lewis’s concept of causation as 
influence (see Aranyosi 2008: 513–514) . There are slight changes in Near 
(or better, following Noë, in the Near-perceiver relation) that would generate 
corresponding changes in what the agent experiences . Any relative displace-
ment between the planet and the observer would result in a change in her 
visual experience . Therefore, the actual position of Near is responsible for her 
actual percept .
Finally, one could also appeal to old Aristotle and think in terms of final 
cause . If the subject is focusing her eyes on the point where Near stands, it is 
probably because she wants to see this planet, rather than the one behind it . 
13 The kind of exception Dretske admits for some limiting cases such as when the subject 
stands with her nose against a concrete wall, unable to visually differentiating it from its im-
mediate environment (see Sorensen 2008: 63), does not apply here – if one stands with her 
nose against Jericho’s wall in a moonless night (during a power outage, if you want), then she 
does not see it .
14 The same goes for Far, in case one wants to endorse Sorensen’s position .
15 “The eye moves continually to keep the light from the object of interest falling on the 
fovea centralis where the bulk of the cones reside” (Nave 2012) .
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In this other case, she would probably wait for the Sorensenian alignment to 
cease and focus on Far – or take a space shuttle and circumnavigate Near, in 
order to see Far, in case the alignment is static . Being so, Near can be thought 
of as being a cause of what is seen . Exactly as the Stagirite would have done .
In sum, I claim that, since we lack an official definition of cause, Near 
can be thought of as being the cause (or one of the causes) of the percept in 
the double-eclipse scenario depicted by Sorensen . His idea that endorsing the 
causal theory of perception necessarily leads us to conclude that the object of 
perception in his Gedankenexperiment is planet Far is suggestive but wrong . 
This also means that the silhouette of an object needs not be identified with 
its absorptive surface, but can very well be identified with that part of the 
shadow which is attached to its caster (as perhaps has always been) .
Near can do better than “simply” comply with the causal theory of 
perception, however . As we have seen in this section, it can score 100% in 
Goldman’s “test” and satisfy a characterization of perception in terms of the 
relevant counterfactual conditionals . Which leads us to conclude that in the 
double-eclipse situation depicted in Seeing Dark Things what is seen is planet 
Near (while in a solar eclipse is the same old face of the Moon) and not planet 
Far, pace Sorensen .
Conclusion
When one looks at the Moon, during a solar eclipse, she probably thinks that 
what she is observing is the always-facing-Earth side of our natural satellite . 
Sorensen reckons this is wrong and maintains that what the agent is actually 
seeing in such a circumstance is the Moon’s inner (concave) part of the far-
ther, reflective one .
To make his point clearer, he put forward the famous example – de-
picted in the introduction – of a double eclipse involving the fictional planets 
Far and Near . In this Gedankenexperiment the two celestial bodies look the 
same size from the observer’s vantage point . “When Near falls exactly under 
the shadow of Far, it is as if one of these heavenly bodies has disappeared . Do 
I see Near or Far? Common sense answers that I see Near rather than Far: 
Near is an opaque body that completely blocks my view of Far . Since I see 
something, I see Near” (Sorensen 2008: 20) .
However, Sorensen explains, since Near is causally idle, it is in fact invis-
ible . “If light were being reflected by Near into my eyes, Near would preempt 
Far . And I would see Near . But because I am actually seeing by virtue of 
partial light blockage, it is Far that preempts Near” (2008: 22) . Accordingly, 
we should not let common sense deceive us and admit that the object of our 
perception in the double eclipse case is planet Far . “The correct solution to 
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the eclipse riddle is that I see Far . This answer follows as a bold consequence 
of the causal theory of perception given natural background assumptions” 
(2008: 24) .
Common sense can obviously be mistaken, sometimes . Should we al-
ways stick to it, we probably would not have the theory of relativity in Phys-
ics, to mention just one example . Then again, Sorensen thinks that we should 
remain faithful to the causal theory of perception not only against common 
sense, but against common vision (observation) criteria too . And this should 
raise a red flag . Are we sure that seeing Far is a bold consequence of the causal 
theory of perception in the so-called “eclipse riddle”?
I answer in the negative and in this paper not only have I tried to show 
that Near can be considered the object of a successful perceptual discrimina-
tion even in the light of the causal theory of perception – all the more so 
because, to my knowledge, despite centuries of debate over this concept, we 
still lack an “official” definition of cause – but also that this idea is in total 
continuity both with Goldman’s (and others’) observation criteria and with 
the notion of observation as an action too; not to mention common sense, 
of course .
As a matter of fact, after agreeing with Sorensen on the existence of 
only two alternatives in the eclipse riddle (either the agent sees Near or she 
sees Far), I have initially shown that many of the arguments he has put for-
ward in order to defend his claim that what one sees in such a circumstance 
is actually planet Far are also compatible with the alternative conclusion 
that Near is in fact the real object of the perception . The amount of infor-
mation extracted from the observation, the amount of darkness of the seen 
disk, the resemblance (to the object) case are not arguments against the 
common sense judgement that what the agent sees during a double eclipse 
is planet Near . Therefore, they are not evidence in favor of Sorensen’s thesis 
either .
On the other hand, other arguments – which are not dealt with in his 
book but that are quite imperative in talks about perception, such as its phe-
nomenological aspect and what exactly is the object of a successful perceptual 
discrimination, along with a discussion on observation as an action – suggest 
that what has just been called “the common sense judgement” should be fa-
vored over Sorensen’s conclusion .
But an argument that, if I am not wrong, is probably fatal for the claim 
that the agent sees planet Far and not planet Near in a double eclipse situ-
ation is the one I called “the astronomical paradox” . In the section devoted 
to this topic, I presented a Gedankenexperiment in which a contradiction 
seems to arise if one wants to endorse a Sorensenian position, since in this 
case the image of the fictional satellite Moon*’s absorptive surface should 
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travel faster than light, while, according to Einstein’s theory of relativity, no 
signal can .
No paradox arises, instead, if one endorses the common sense judge-
ment that what the agent sees is the surface which is facing Earth* . Being so, 
in the successive section I have tried to show that Near can be considered the 
object of a successful perceptual discrimination even in the light of Gold-
man’s (and others’) observation criteria and of the notion of observation as an 
action . These are in total continuity with common sense, of course . And with 
the causal theory of perception, too .
Hence my conclusion, that in the double eclipse situation depicted in 
Seeing Dark Things what the agent sees is planet Near and not planet Far .
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